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Although a trend toward adopting Section 102(b)(7)-type provisions is
not yet evident, its widespread proposal signifies Delaware corporate
board confidence that it will ease director concerns over personal liabil-
ity. Moreover, widespread enactment of Section 102(b)(7)-type provi-
sions by state legislatures and a corresponding adoption of indemnity
provisions by corporations nationwide could remove the need of many
directors to retain costly indemnity insurance.
James B. Behrens
THE URGENT NEED FOR SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
An estimated ten to fifteen percent of all married couples are infertile.'
The rate of infertility has increased dramatically over the past 20 years.2
The rise in infertility is due to a variety of causes including use of certain
drugs and contraceptive devices,3 sexually transmitted diseases, 4 chemi-
1. L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTIL-
rTY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SUR-
ROGATE MOTHERHOOD, 2 (1984). Approximately 15% of couples are unable to conceive after one
year of unprotected intercourse. R. HATCHER & G. STEWARD, CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
1986-1987 (13th rev. ed. 1986).
2. The overall infertility rate in the United States is almost three times as much as it was 20
years ago. The Saddest Epidemic, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50. The National Center for Health
Statistics compared a 1965 survey with a 1976 survey and found an 83% increase in infertility
among married couples in which the wife was 20-24 years old, a group which is considered most
fertile. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 2.
3. A variety of drugs including high blood pressure and ulcer medications can lower a man's
sperm production. Sons and daughters of women who took DES (di-ethyl-stilbestrol) have a higher
incidence of certain types of fertility problems. L. ANDREWS, supra note I, at 23-25. Use of the
IUD sometimes leads to infertility by causing severe inflammation of the uterine lining or by increas-
ing a woman's risk of pelvic inflammatory disease which causes scarring and blockage of a woman's
fallopian tubes. Id. at 25-26. Abortion can also cause infections which can lead to infertility. Id. at
26.
4. According to Centers for Disease Control, one million people contract sexually transmitted
diseases each year. Infertility results in 150,000 to 200,000 of those cases. Sexually transmitted
diseases lead to infertility by scarring the woman's fallopian tubes or the man's sperm ducts. Id. at
29.
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cal pollutants,5 and postponement of childbearing.6 While the rate of
infertility has risen, adoption, the traditional option for childless couples,
has become less available. The widespread use of contraception and the
legalization of abortion has led to fewer unwanted births. In addition,
the increased acceptance of single parenthood has resulted in more un-
wed mothers keeping their children rather than giving them up for adop-
tion.7 Consequently, an infertile couple must often wait several years to
adopt an infant.8
Many couples are turning to new reproductive techniques to achieve
conception.9 A surrogate motherhood arrangement is an option that a
couple may choose if the wife is infertile,"0 unable to carry a child, I or in
5. Certain herbicides have been connected with an increased rate of miscarriages. Further-
more, many chemical pollutants in the environment are responsible for lowering men's sperm pro-
duction. The workplace can also pose fertility hazards. Health care workers, exposed to radioactive
materials and anesthetic gas, are at risk. Other workers who deal with various chemicals may also
suffer adverse effects. Id. at 21-23.
6. Men and woman are most fertile between the ages of twenty and twenty-five; after twenty-
five the ability to conceive a child tapers off. Many young couples, because of the educational and
career opportunities available to women, are postponing child bearing. The likelihood of a woman
conceiving after six months of trying to conceive decreases significantly once over age 25. A twenty-
five year old woman has a 75% chance to conceive, a woman in her late twenties has a 47% chance
to conceive, in her early thirties, a 38% chance to conceive, and a 25% chance to conceive in her late
thirties. Id. at 30.
7. Note, Womb for Rent: A Callfor Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulating Sur-
rogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICKINSON L. REV. 227 (1985). In 1971, 13% of unwed teenage
mothers chose adoption, while in 1978 only 4% chose adoption. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 3.
8. In 1975, it was reported that the wait for a healthy infant was from three to seven years.
Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. on Children and
Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel/are, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1975).
9. New reproductive techniques which help infertile couples to have a baby include in vitro
fertilization, artificial insemination by husband or donor, egg donation, artificial embryonation, em-
bryo adoption, surrogate carrier, and surrogate motherhood. For a detailed description of these
reproductive techniques see The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Con-
siderations of the Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY, Supplement 1, 32S-48S,
58S-68S (1986).
10. A woman's infertility may be caused by an inability to produce eggs from the ovaries,
damage to the fallopian tubes, or she may have had a hysterectomy, a removal of the uterus which
sometimes includes removal of the ovaries and fallopian tubes. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 198.
If a woman's infertility is caused by damage to the fallopian tubes and she is able to ovulate,
another reproductive option is available. She may choose to undergo in vitro fertilization which
involves surgical removal of the eggs, incubation of sperm and eggs in a laboratory culture, then
transfer of the resulting preembryo into the uterus. See The Ethics Committee of the American
Fertility Society, supra note 9, at 32S.
11. Some women are unable to carry a child to term and experience miscarriage and spontane-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/8
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situations in which a wife would pass on a genetic defect to the child.' 2
This option requires the participation of a surrogate mother.13 A surro-
gate mother is a woman who agrees to be artificially inseminated with the
sperm of a man whose wife is unable to have a child. 4 The surrogate
mother contractually agrees to terminate her parental rights and allow
the infertile couple to adopt the child following birth. 5
This Development will describe the typical provisions in surrogate
motherhood agreements, discuss the judicial response to surrogate moth-
erhood arrangements, present an overview of existing legislation which
affects surrogate motherhood arrangements, and will evaluate current
surrogate motherhood legislative proposals and suggest a comprehensive
legislative approach to surrogate motherhood arrangements.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
AGREEMENTS
The surrogate motherhood agreement between the surrogate mother
ous abortion. Some women are advised by their physician not to become pregnant because of health
conditions such as severe high blood pressure or diabetes. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 198.
Another reproductive option is available to a woman who is unable to carry a child to term. If the
woman's ovaries are functioning, her egg could be fertilized with her husband's sperm in a labora-
tory culture, then the resulting preembryo could be transferred to a surrogate carrier. This option
has the advantage of producing a child who is biologicaally related to both the husband and wife. Id.
See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 9, at 58S.
12. Some genetic disorders are transmitted by the mother to male offspring, such as hemophilia
and a form of muscular dystrophy. J. WYNGAARDEN & L. SMITH, JR., TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 25
(16th ed. 1982).
13. A surrogate mother may be obtained through an advertisement or with the help of a surro-
gate mother program which matches infertile couples with surrogate mothers. N. KEANE & D.
BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 281 (1981). Noel P. Kearne is a Michigan Attorney who helps to
bring infertile couples together with potential surrogate mothers. He is also founder of Surrogate
Family Services in Dearborn, Michigan. Note, supra note 7, at 229 n.17. Surrogate mother pro-
grams also exist in California, Kansas, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. L. ANDREWS, supra
note 1, at 317-318.
14. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 198. One advantage of the surrogate motherhood arrange-
ment over adoption is that the child will be biologically related to the natural father who donates his
sperm to the surrogate mother. Id.
The number of children born by surrogate motherhood arrangements was recently estimated at
600. Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74. Demo-
graphic studies of surrogate mothers have revealed that the average age of a surrogate mother is 25
years old, over one-half are married, one-fifth divorced, and about one-fourth single. Over one-half
have graduated from high school, and one-fourth have had education beyond high school. About
57% are Protestant and 42% are Catholic. See The Ethics Committee of the American Family
Society, supra note 9, at 62S.
15. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 6.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1987] SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD LEGISLATION
and the infertile couple usually provides for payment of the surrogate
mother's medical, living expenses related to the pregnancy, and a sub-
stantial fee in exchange for the surrogate mother's promise to relinquish
the child. 6 The contract may include detailed provisions concerning
medical, psychological, and genetic screening of the surrogate mother
and the infertile couple. The contract may also deal with a multitude of
contingencies which may arise such as the surrogate's desire to have an
abortion, miscarriage of the child, the surrogate's death during child-
birth, birth of an abnormal infant, or the surrogate's refusal to give con-
sent to adoption. 7 Although the surrogate motherhood agreement often
includes provisions which clearly spell out the rights and responsibilities
of each party, these contract provisions may not survive judicial scrutiny.
Generally, courts have rejected surrogate arrangements on the basis of
law not specifically regulating surrogate motherhood arrangements. Few
courts have considered surrogate motherhood arrangements. Those that
16. Note, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 2,
3 (1986).
There may be no contractual agreement if private, informal arrangements are made, such as ar-
rangements between sisters or friends. For a sample contract between the infertile couple and a
volunteer surrogate mother see N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 13, at 290.
The standard fee paid to surrogate mothers is $10,000 plus expenses. See Gelman & Shapiro,
supra note 14, at 74 and N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 13, at 16. Payment of the surrogate is
believed to be necessary to compensate the surrogate mother for her significant involvement in the
reproductive process. Unlike an artificial insemination donor, who merely donates his sperm, the
surrogate mother's contribution is more significant. She donates not only her egg, but also her
womb. She carries the child for nine months and assumes the risk of pregnancy and child birth.
Payment of the surrogate mother is necessary because there are not enough voluntary surrogate
mothers to meet the needs of infertile couples. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society, supra note 9, at 66S. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
17. For a sample surrogate motherhood agreement see N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 13, at
291-96. A contract should require the surrogate mother and the sperm donor to undergo physical
and genetic evaluations. The surrogate mother should also be required to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation. This contract would forbid abortion unless the abortion is necessary for the physical
health of the surrogate mother or the child is determined to be abnormal. Id. at 294. This contract
would provide for no compensation if the surrogate miscarried the child prior to the fifth month of
pregnancy. The infertile couple would also have to pay the cost of term life insurance on the surro-
gate mother's life, which would be payable to the surrogate's named beneficiary if the surrogate died
during pregnancy, childbirth or within six weeks subsequent to the birth. Id. at 293. The infertile
couple is bound by the contract to assume parental responsibilities for an abnormal child if they have
been advised of the risk of such abnormalities. Id at 294. The surrogate mother and her husband, if
she is married, agree to surrender custody of the child and to relinquish any parental rights upon the
birth of the child. Id. at 292. The contract may also contain the surrogate mother's agreement to
not smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, or use any illegal drugs and to follow a prenatal medical exami-
nation schedule. Id. at 294. See also L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 234-35 (advocating use of
contracts with detailed provisions spelling out the rights and responsibilities of the parties).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss2/8
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have generally viewed the arrangements with disfavor; however, no court
has conducted an extensive evaluation and most have rejected the ar-
rangements on the basis of existing legislation not specifically aimed at
regulating surrogate motherhood arrangements.
Two state courts of appeals have held that payment in connection with
surrogate motherhood arrangements violates state statutes which pro-
hibit baby selling."8 In Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc., 19 the Kentucky Circuit Court held that the Surrogate Parenting As-
sociation did not violate the Kentucky statute prohibiting payment in
connection with adoption by arranging surrogate motherhood transac-
tions.2" The circuit court reasoned that because the statute was designed
to prevent the sale of children, it could not apply to the natural father
who donated his sperm to the surrogate mother since a father cannot buy
the right to adopt his natural child.2" The court believed that payment in
connection with a surrogate motherhood arrangement was not for the
child, but for the surrogate mother's services in carrying the child and
agreement to terminate her parental rights. Further, the court stated
that the policy underlying the baby-selling statute was to prevent ar-
rangements between the mother and strangers, not arrangements be-
tween the mother and the natural father of the child.22
On appeal,23 the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and held that
surrogate motherhood arrangements violate the Kentucky baby-selling
statute.24 The court pointed out that the Kentucky legislature had
amended the baby-selling statute to authorize in vitro fertilization25 and
that the legislature considered, but refused, to amend the statute to au-
18. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text for a description of the baby-selling statutes,
19. 10 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 1105 (Franklin Cty. Cir. Ct. 1983) rev'd sub nom. Kentucky ex rel.
Armstrong v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
20. 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 1107.
21. Id. at 1106.
22. Id.
23. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong v. Parenting Assocs., Inc., I 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1985).
24. Id. at 1360. The Kentucky statute, KY. REV. STAT. § 199.590(2), provided, in pertinent
part, as follows:
No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may sell or purchase or procure for sale or
purchase any phild for the purpose of adoption or any other purpose, including termination
of parental rights.
Id. at 1359.
25. The amendment provided that nothing in the baby-selling statute "shall be construed to
prohibit in vitro fertilization." Id.
[Vol. 65:481
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thorize surrogate motherhood arrangements. 26  The court interpreted
this legislative inaction as an indication that the legislature believed that
surrogate motherhood arrangements are contrary to the statute's policy
against the sale of children for adoption.27 The court rejected the lower
court's assumption that the sperm donor was the legal father of the child
and therefore could not adopt his own child. The court stated that ab-
sent strong proof otherwise, the sperm donor was a stranger to the child
because of a legal presumption that the surrogate's husband is the legiti-
mate father.28 In addition, the court believed that payment to the surro-
gate mother was payment in connection with an adoption and thus
violated the statutory prohibition because adoption of the child by the
infertile wife was an integral part of surrogate motherhood agreements
arranged by the Surrogate Parenting Association.29 Finally, the court
concluded that the Surrogate Parenting Association violated the Ken-
tucky baby-selling statute because it profited from arranging surrogate
motherhood transactions.3a
In Doe v. Kelley,3  an infertile couple who had entered a surrogate
motherhood agreement sought a declaratory judgment that the Michigan
baby-selling statute violated their constitutional right to privacy. The
couple argued that the statute interfered with their right to decide
whether to bear or beget a child.32 The Michigan Court of Appeals af-
firmed a denial of the declaratory judgment and held that although the
infertile couple's right to have a child may be constitutionally protected,
26. The legislature considered amending the baby-selling statute to provide that it should not
be "construed to prohibit surrogate parenting" and to define surrogate parenting. Id.
27. The court cited no legislative reports, debates, or hearings to support its position; the court
merely pointed out that the in vitro fertilization amendment was adopted and the surrogate parent-
ing amendment was not, and stated the following:
Obviously, the legislature considered the two processes and rejected the former while ap-
proving the latter, as the language regarding surrogate parenting was not adopted into law.
We interpret this recent legislative history as a clear signal that surrogate parenting, as
discussed herein, violates the current statute's predecessor and its policy against the unau-
thorized purchase and sale of children for adoption purposes.
Id.
It is possible that the legislature did not adopt the surrogate parenting amendment, not because
surrogate arrangements are contrary to the policy underlying the baby-selling statutes, but because
the legislature believed that the matter required further consideration and a more comprehensive
approach.
28. Id. at 1359-60. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
29. Id. at 1360.
30. Id.
31. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
32. Id. at 172, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
1987]
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payment in connection with the surrogate motherhood arrangement
which contemplated use of the state adoption procedures was not consti-
tutionally protected and thus was subject to reasonable regulation by the
state.33
The Kentucky Circuit Court in In re Baby Girl 31 refused to terminate
the parental rights of a surrogate mother and her husband and transfer
custody of the child to the sperm donor because of the strong common-
law presumption that a child born in wedlock is the husband's legitimate
child.35 The court stated that an affidavit concerning the occurrence of
artificial insemination, without blood tests or other evidence, was not suf-
ficient proof that the sperm donor was the natural father of the child.
The court further stated that even if paternity could be established, the
court would not grant an order of termination because the surrogate
mother had ignored the requirements of the Adoption Act by making
private arrangements with the infertile couple.36
III. EXISTING LEGISLATION
Although several states are considering surrogate motherhood legisla-
tion,37 no state has enacted a statute regulating surrogate arrange-
33. The court stated its conclusion as follows:
While the decision to bear or beget a child has thus been found to be a fundamental interest
protected by the right of privacy, (citation omitted), we do not view this right as a valid
prohibition to state interference in the plaintiffs' contractual arrangement. The statute in
question does not directly prohibit John Doe and Mary Roe from having the child as
planned. It acts instead to preclude plaintiffs from paying consideration in conjunction
with their use of the state's adoption procedures. In effect, the plaintiff's contractual agree-
ment discloses a desire to use the adoption code to change the legal status of the child....
We do not perceive this goal as within the realm of fundamental interests protected by the
right to privacy from reasonable governmental regulation.
Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
34. 9 FAM. L. REP. 2348 (BNA) (Jefferson Cty. Cir. Ct. 1983).
35. The court cited several Kentucky cases which support this presumption including Vanover
v. Steele, 174 Ky. 114, 190 S.W. 667 (1917), which provided "[e]vidence that the child's mother is
married and that there was opportunity for procreation within the period of gestation raises a con-
clusive presumption that the child is the husband's legitimate child." 9 FAM. L. REP. at 2348.
36. The Adoption Act required an investigation of the prospective adoptive couple, prior to
placement of the child, by a licensed adoption agency to determine the couple's suitability to receive
the child. Id.
For a discussion of the surrogate motherhood case decided by the New Jersey Superior Court see
Galen, Surrogate Law: The Decision in a Novel Case in New Jersey could have Wide-Reaching Impli.
cations for Infertile Couples and Surrogate Motherhood, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 1, col. I. The
trial judge has awarded temporary custody of the child to the infertile couple pending trial. Id.
37. Legislative consideration of surrogate motherhood arrangements has taken place in the Dis.
trict of Columbia and in the following twenty-one states: Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ments.38 As illustrated by the cases discussed above,3 9 existing
legislation cannot deal adequately with surrogate motherhood arrange-
ments. Baby-selling, adoption, and artificial insemination statutes ini-
tially did not contemplate and were not designed to handle surrogate
motherhood arrangements. 4
A. Baby-selling Statutes
Twenty-four states have enacted baby-selling statutes that prohibit
payment in connection with an adoption.41 These statutes are aimed at
preventing black-market sales of babies.42 In a black-market adoption,
the legal channels for adoption are circumvented.43 Since no licensed
adoption agency is involved in a black-market adoption, the natural
mother receives no counseling and no evaluation of the adoptive couple's
fitness is performed. Instead, a baby-broker offers to sell the infant to an
adoptive couple who is able and willing to pay an exorbitant fee.' The
baby-broker is not concerned with the welfare of the child, the natural
mother, or the adoptive parents. The broker's primary concern is profit-
making and, thus, no procedures are undertaken to protect the interests
of the parties involved. The natural mother, often young and unwed,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. Pierce,
Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, II FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3003
(1985).
38. Id. See also Who Keeps 'Baby M'? Newsweek, Jan. 19, 1987, at 45.
Recently the Vatican issued a statement on reproductive ethics which forbids use of various repro-
ductive techniques including surrogate motherhood arrangements. See Mandel & Paul, Infertility-
Vatican Constraints Debated, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 12, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
39. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
40. L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 226.
41. For a listing of the state baby-selling statute citations see Note, supra note 16, at 8 n.34.
42. Black-market adoptions arose because of the decreased supply of adoptable infants coupled
with the increased demand for children. See supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text concerning
the reasons for the decreased availability of adoptable infants.
43. There are two major types of adoption, agency adoptions and independent or private adop-
tions. In an agency adoption, a licensed agency makes arrangements for the adoption, providing
counseling for the natural mother and conducting a thorough investigation of the adoptive couple.
In an independent adoption, an intermediary, such as a lawyer or doctor, makes the arrangements.
Generally, a thorough investigation of the adoptive couple is not made in an independent adoption.
The adoptive couple pays for the natural mother's medical expenses and legal fees. In a black-
market adoption, the adoptive couple pays the mother for the infant. C. DAKIN, H. ROSSEN & W.
SOGG, FAMILY LAW 97-98 (1975).
44. In addition to charging exorbitant fees, some baby-brokers auction off a child to two or
more couples, giving the child to the highest bidder. Note, supra note 16, at 16.
1987]
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may be coerced by economic and social pressures into giving up her
child.45
Although the baby-selling statutes were enacted to deal with black-
market adoptions, the statutes may serve as an obstacle to surrogate
motherhood arrangements which provide for a substantial fee to be paid
to the surrogate mother. The surrogate fee can be viewed as compensa-
tion to the surrogate mother for her services of carrying and bearing the
child.4 6 Some courts, however, have viewed the fee as an illegal payment
in connection with an adoption.47
Surrogate motherhood arrangements differ from black-market adop-
tions because the surrogate is not pressured into giving up her child after
becoming pregnant, but rather, voluntarily chooses to enter into an
agreement to relinquish parental rights before she becomes pregnant.48
The interests of the child are better protected by a surrogate arrangement
because the child is not merely going to the highest bidder, but will be
adopted by her natural father and his wife. In addition, surrogate moth-
erhood arrangements, unlike black-market adoptions, can be regulated to
provide further safeguards, such as psychological, medical, and genetic
screening of the parties.
B. Adoption Statutes Governing Consent
Adoption statutes which provide for a mandatory waiting period fol-
lowing birth before consent to adoption 49 also conflict with the typical
surrogate arrangement. The statutory waiting period gives the natural
mother an opportunity to consider her decision to relinquish parental
rights and tends to ensure that consent to adoption is voluntary." In a
typical surrogate motherhood arrangement, however, the surrogate
mother consents to termination of parental rights when she signs the sur-
45. See generally Note, Black-Market Adoption, 22 CATH. LAW 48 (1976).
46. Note, Surrogate Motherhood in Ohio: A Dangerous Game of Baby Roulette, 15 CAP. U.L.
REV. 93, 98 (1985) (arguing that payment to the surrogate is "compensation of her loss of work, the
inconvenience of pregnancy, and the stress of childbirth").
47. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
48. See Note, supra note 16, at 21. See also Note, supra note 7, at 253; Note, supra note 46, at
98.
49. See, e-g., the Pennsylvania statute which provides in pertinent part that "[n]o consent shall
be valid if it was executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the child." 23 PA, CONS.
STAT. § 2711(c) (1982). See also Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.601 (1981) (5 day waiting period); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.08(A) (Page 1980) (72 hour waiting period).
50. Note, supra note 45, at 51 n.13.
[Vol. 65:481
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rogate motherhood agreement.51 Technically, the surrogate mother's
consent would be invalid in a state requiring a mandatory waiting period;
however, these provisions were designed to prevent a mother from being
coerced into giving up her child for adoption. The surrogate mother's
position is unlike the natural mother's position in a traditional adoption,
because the surrogate mother makes a conscious decision to relinquish
her child before she becomes pregnant and therefore is unlikely to feel
coerced into giving up her child because of economic and social
pressures. 52
C. Artificial Insemination Statutes
Twenty-six states have enacted laws which provide that the husband of
an artificially inseminated woman is considered by law the legal father of
the child conceived through this process.53 Although these statutes may
be appropriate where the husband is infertile and a couple wants to have
a child by artificial insemination, these statutes conflict with surrogate
motherhood arrangements.
Surrogate motherhood arrangements have been described as the re-
verse of artificial insemination.54 Both reproductive techniques involve
the assistance of a third person in the reproductive process. In the case
of artificial insemination, however, the couple cannot conceive because of
the male's infertility and, thus, the assistance of a sperm donor is re-
quired.55 The artificial insemination statutes recognize that the parties in
this situation intend that the husband of the artificially inseminated wo-
man, rather than the sperm donor, be considered the legal father. To the
51. Note, supra note 7, at 243.
52. Id. at 253.
53. For a listing of the artificial insemination statute citations see id. at 234 n.52.
The Uniform Parentage Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a
wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband
is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr § 5 (1979).
In some states, a common-law presumption exists that a child conceived during wedlock is the
legitimate child of the husband. See supra notes 28 & 35 and accompanying text.
54. Note, supra note 7, at 231.
55. Technically, there are two types of artificial insemination: (1) artificial insemination by
donor, which involves a donor's semen because the husband is infertile; and (2) artificial insemina-
tion by husband, which involves use of the husband's sperm in the artificial insemination process
because the husband is unable to achieve ejaculation within the vagina or has a poor sperm produc-
tion. See The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 9, at 34S-38S.
In this discussion, artificial insemination is used to refer to artificial insemination by donor.
1987]
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contrary, in the surrogate motherhood arrangement the couple cannot
conceive because of the female's infertility and therefore require the
assistance of a surrogate mother. Artificial insemination statutes under-
mine the parties' intentions in a surrogate motherhood agreement be-
cause the purpose of the contract is not to make the surrogate's husband
the legal father, but to make the infertile couple the legal parents of the
child.
It is apparent that legislation which was enacted to deal with issues
and problems arising in the contexts of black-market adoption, tradi-
tional adoption and male infertility cannot adequately address the unique
issues that arise in surrogate motherhood arrangements. Legislative
guidelines specifically directed to surrogate motherhood agreements are
needed.
IV. SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Four basic approaches have been taken by states considering surrogate
motherhood legislation.56 A few bills have been aimed at prohibiting
surrogate motherhood arrangements entirely by making such arrange-
ments void. 7 The remaining bills permit surrogate motherhood arrange-
ments but vary as to the degree of regulation imposed.
One commentator has characterized the various legislative approaches
as streamlined, detailed and moderate." The streamlined bills simply
legalize surrogate motherhood arrangements but do not provide any gui-
dance on what terms should be included in a surrogate motherhood con-
tract or on how various contingencies should be handled and do not
contain any psychological, medipal or genetic screening requirements.5 9
The detailed approach provides for extensive regulation of surrogate
motherhood arrangements. These bills specify numerous detailed provi-
sions which must be included in the surrogate motherhood agreement
concerning psychological and medical evaluations, relinquishment of the
surrogate's parental rights, the infertile couple's assumption of parental
responsibilities, and the surrogate's rights and responsibilities during
56. For a listing of the states which have considered surrogate motherhood legislation, see
supra note 37.
57. See Ky. H.B. 668, 1986 Reg. Sess. (1986). See also Note, supra note 16, at 41-43 (discussing
legislative proposals prohibiting surrogate motherhood arrangements).
58. Note, supra note 16, at 44-51.
59. Id. at 44.
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pregnancy.' In addition, the detailed bills also provide for extensive
court involvement, requiring compliance with legal proceedings similar
to those required under the adoption laws. 61 Finally, the moderate bills
take a middle-of-the-road approach to surrogate motherhood arrange-
ments, requiring the parties to undergo limited medical and psychologi-
cal evaluations and to include some specified provisions relating to their
respective rights and responsibilities in their contract.62
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
A comprehensive legislative approach to surrogate motherhood ar-
rangements is necessary. The legislation should specify the rights and
responsibilities of the infertile couple and the surrogate mother, protect
the best interests of the child, and provide for limited judicial involve-
ment. Existing legislation should also be amended to reflect the special
nature of surrogate motherhood arrangements.
A. Infertile Couples' Rights and Responsibilities
To ensure that an infertile couple actually needs the surrogate mother-
hood option, legislation should require couples to undergo fertility test-
ing to determine whether they are unable to conceive a child or are likely
to have a child with a significant genetic impairment.63 The couple
should also be made aware of the various reproductive techniques avail-
60. These bills also provide solutions for various contingencies such as death of the infertile
couple. If the husband or wife dies prior to the child's birth, then the survivor assumes custody. If
both die, the surrogate would still receive the compensation fee and could choose to keep the child or
give the child up for adoption. Id. at 47.
61. The legislation may require the infertile couple to file a petition for judicial permission to
enter into a surrogate motherhood arrangement. The court may order an investigation of the infer-
tile couple to evaluate their suitability as prospective parents prior to granting the petition. When
the surrogate becomes pregnant, notice is filed with the court. After the child is born, the infertile
wife adopts the child. There is no need for her husband to adopt the child because as the sperm
donor he is deemed the natural parent of any child born as a result of this arrangement. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 48-57.
63. See, e.g., Mich. H.B. 4555, § 4(l)(e) (1985); N.Y. S.B. 1429, §§ 119(1), 123(2)(b) (1987).
The Michigan bill requires that the infertile couple obtain a medical certificate stating that they are
unlikely to conceive or are likely to have a child with a significant mental or physical impairment.
Under the New York bill, an infertile couple would have to include a physician's affidavit, along with
their petition to the court for approval of the surrogate motherhood arrangement, which stated that
the couple has been unable to conceive for one year or more while not using birth control, or that
pregnancy would pose significant health risks to the mother or child, or that the wife is sterile. See
also The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 9, at 63S (emphasizing the
proper medical indications for the use of the surrogate mother option).
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able to them so that they can make an informed choice regarding the
surrogate motherhood option.64
The couple should receive psychological counseling to make them
aware of the responsibilities of surrogate parenthood and to evaluate
their suitability as parents.65 The husband should undergo medical and
genetic examinations to screen for any sexually transmitted disease or
genetically transmitted condition.66 The infertile couple should pay for
the surrogate mother's medical and legal costs connected with the preg-
nancy and the surrogate arrangement and should also pay a reasonable
fee to compensate the surrogate mother for her services.6 7
64. See supra notes 10 & 11 describing other reproductive options.
65. See, eg., Cal. Assembly 1707, §§ 7518(a), 75190), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Mich. H.R.
4555, § 4(l)(c) (1985); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 124(2) (1987). The Michigan bill requires that a mental
health professional sign a written acknowledgement that the couple has been counseled, fully under-
stands the responsibilities of surrogate parenthood, and is ready to assume these responsibilities.
The California bill requires the infertile couple, the surrogate mother, and the surrogate's husband, if
any, to obtain psychological counseling at least 30 days prior to entering a surrogate motherhood
contract. The California bill is unique in that it also requires continued psychological counseling, for
all parties, which may end no earlier than two months after the child's birth.
66. Some bills only require the surrogate mother to undergo medical and genetic screening.
Because the sperm donor plays an important role in the reproductive process, he should also be
required to undergo screening. The following bills require the sperm donor to undergo medical
evaluation: Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(b), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); D.C. Council Bill 6-152,
§ 5(a)(1) (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 9(14) (1983); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 122(1)(i) (1987).
67. The bills vary as to which expenses should or may be paid by the infertile couple and as to
whether the surrogate should receive a compensation fee. Some bills require that the infertile couple
pay for medical or psychological expenses connected with the surrogate's pregnancy. See, e.g., Haw.
H.B. 1009, § 9(13) (1983). Other bills provide that the parties may agree upon who will be responsi-
ble for medical expenses. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, 7519(c), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); D.C.
Council Bill 6-152, § 5(c) (1985); Kan. S.B. 485, § 9(b)(2) (1984).
The D.C. Council bill states that the infertile couple may also agree to pay the surrogate's legal
expenses related to the surrogate motherhood agreement and for special clothing, food, and
medicines required by the pregnancy. The bill, however, prohibits payment of a compensation fee to
the surrogate mother. D.C. Council Bill 6-152, §§ 5(d) (1985). The New York bill provides that the
infertile couple must pay legal expenses and for life and health insurance for the surrogate mother.
N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 122(1)(f), (2) (1987). The California bill also requires that life and health insur-
ance be procured, but allows the parties to agree upon who will be responsible for payment of these
costs. Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(d), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985), Two bills provide that the infertile
couple are not liable for wages that the surrogate loses as a result of the pregnancy unless the surro-
gate agreement expressly provided for payment of lost wages. See Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(i),
1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 9(13) (1983).
Several bills require that the infertile couple pay the surrogate a reasonable fee for her services in
addition to any payment of medical expenses. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(e), 1985-86 Reg.
Sess. (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 9(12) (1983); Kan. S.B. 485, § 9(2) (1984); N.Y. S.B. 1429,
§ 122(l)(g) (1987); R.I. Assembly 6132, § 1, 15-16-2(B) (1983). The South Carolina bill requires
court approval of any fees and expenses agreed to by the parties. S.C. H.B. 2098, 20-7-3760 (1982).
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Moreover, the legislation should require the couple to assume all pa-
rental rights and responsibilities upon the child's birth regardless of the
child's condition.68 If the husband or wife dies prior to the child's birth,
the survivor should take responsibility for the child.6 9 Following the
child's birth, the husband should submit to blood or tissue-typing tests to
conclusively establish the paternity of the child.7"
B. Surrogate Mother's Rights and Responsibilities
The legislation should require the surrogate mother to undergo medi-
cal and genetic screening to ensure that she is in good health and to
decrease the probability of the birth of a genetically impaired child.7
The surrogate mother and her husband, if married, should receive psy-
chological counseling prior to signing the surrogate motherhood agree-
ment to ensure that they understand the potential psychological
consequences of the surrogate motherhood arrangement and are able to
voluntarily consent to the arrangement.72
When the surrogate motherhood agreement is signed, the surrogate
mother should give written consent to relinquish parental rights upon the
birth of the child.73 It would also be advisable for the husband of the
Two bills prohibit payment of a compensation fee. See Conn. Assembly 5816 (1987); D.C. Council
Bill 6-152, § 5(d) (1985).
68. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7512, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Mich. H.R. 4555,
§ 5(l)(b) (1985); N.J. Assembly 3038, § 6(c) (1986); R.I. Assembly 6132, § 1, 15-16-2(c) (1983). The
California bill contains a caveat, the infertile couple will assume custody of the child regardless of
any disease or defect, "unless the disease or defect is the result of some act or failure to act by the
surrogate in violation of the surrogate contract."
69. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7511, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 9(18)
(1983); Mich. H.R. 4555, § 4(2) (1985).
70. See, eg., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(m), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); D.C. Council Bill 6-
152, § 6(a) (1985); Kan. S.B. 485, § 9(b)(3) (1984); Mich. H.R. 4555, § 8(1) (1985). The sperm
donor, surrogate mother, and the surrogate's husband, if any, must submit to blood or tissue-typing
tests.
71. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(b) 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009,
§ 9(a)(6); Mich. H.B. 4555, § 7(1)(a) (1985); N.J. Assembly 3038, § 5 (1986); S.C. H.B. 1098, § 20-7-
3770 (j) (1982). The Michigan bill directs that medical and genetic screening of the surrogate
mother should take place at the sperm donor's option. Mandatory screening is preferable.
72. The California bill requires that the surrogate and her husband, if any, as well as the infer-
tile couple receive counseling which would begin at least 30 days prior to entering a surrogate moth-
erhood agreement and continuing until two months after the child's birth. Cal. Assembly 1707,
§ 7518(a), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). The Michigan bill requires psychological counseling of the
surrogate mother to ensure that she understands the psychological consequences of the surrogate
arrangement and is able to consent. Mich. H.R. 4555, § 4(1)(f) (1985). See also D.C. Council Bill 6-
152, § 3(b)(5) (1985); Kan. S.B. 485, § 4(a)(3)(B) (1984); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 124(2) (1987).
73. Most bills require that the surrogate mother agree in the surrogate motherhood agreement
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surrogate mother to release any legal rights to the child to overcome any
common-law presumption that a child born in wedlock is the legitimate
child of the husband.74
If unforeseen circumstances such as the death of the infertile couple
occurs prior to the birth of the child, the surrogate mother and her hus-
band should be given the opportunity to assume parental rights and re-
sponsibilities for the child.75 After the child's birth, the surrogate could
decide whether to keep the child or place the child for adoption with
another couple. The surrogate and her husband should be required to
assume custody of the child or place the child for adoption if the infertile
couple challenges the paternity of the child and the court determines that
the sperm donor is not the biological father of the child.7 6
The legislation should specifically state that payment in connection
to relinquish parental rights. See, eg., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7519(a), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985);
Mich. H.B. 4555, § 6(l) (1985); N.J. Assembly 3038, § 6(c) (1986); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 122(1)(b)
(1987). Some bills expressly require the consent of the surrogate's husband as well. See, e.g., D.C.
Council Bill 6-152, § 3(b)(4) (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 4(c) (1983); S.C. H.B. 2098, § 20-7-3780(c)
(1982). The bills differ, however, as to the effect of this consent. Under the D.C. Council bill, the
consent, permanently relinquishing parental rights to the child, is effective upon the birth of the
child. D.C. Council Bill 6-152, § 4(c) (1985). Under the Kansas bill, however, the surrogate mother
may void the surrogate motherhood agreement within forty-eight hours after the birth of the child.
Kan. S.B. 485, § 9(b)(4) (1984). The Hawaii and New Jersey bills employ more subjective standards
and provide that the infertile couple will assume custody of the child upon birth unless the surrogate
demonstrates that the "best interests of the child" are not served by termination of the surrogate's
parental rights or the court finds that "extraordinary circumstances require otherwise." Haw. H.B.
1009, § 7(c) (1983); N.J. Assembly 3038, § 15 (1986).
The Michigan bill permits the surrogate mother to revoke her consent and initiate a custody
action within twenty days after the child's birth. A provision permitting the surrogate mother to
revoke her consent and to initiate child custody proceedings is at odds with the purpose of the
surrogate motherhood agreement, which is to allow the infertile couple to assume custody upon the
birth of-the child. A right to revoke consent is not necessary for the protection of the surrogate
mother. The psychological counseling provided to the surrogate mother prior to entering into the
surrogate motherhood agreement adequately protects her interests. The counseling helps to ensure
that the surrogate's consent to relinquishment of parental rights is voluntary and makes the surro-
gate aware of the potential psychological consequences of the arrangement. A provision directing
that the surrogate assume parental rights of the child is found not to be the biological child of the
sperm donor, provides additional protection for the surrogate's rights. See infra notes 87 & 88 and
accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 28, 35 & 73 and accompanying text.
75. Some bills permit the surrogate mother to assume parental rights, under these circum-
stances, at her option. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7511(c), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Haw.
H.B. 1009, § 9(a)(19) (1983). Other bills provide that the surrogate mother will automatically have
all parental rights and responsibilities for the child under these circumstances. See, e.g., D.C. Coun-
cil Bill 6-152, § 3(c) (1985); Mich. H.R. 4555, § 4(3) (1985).
76. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7522(a), (1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); D.C. Council Bill 6-
152, § 4(d) (1985); Mich. H.R. 4555, § 11(1) (1985).
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with surrogate motherhood arrangements is permissible.7 The surrogate
mother should receive payment of medical and legal expenses and also a
reasonable fee to compensate her for undertaking the risks and discom-
fort of carrying and bearing a child.7' The legislature may wish to set a
reasonable limit on the fee to prevent surrogate arrangements from be-
coming an option that only the wealthy can afford.79
The surrogate mother should be permitted to update the information
in the surrogate motherhood documents to reflect her current name and
address.8" And the child born through a surrogate motherhood arrange-
ment should have complete right of access to these records when he or
she reaches eighteen years old.8t
C. Judicial Involvement
Surrogate motherhood legislation should provide for court involve-
ment for the purpose of collecting and maintaining the documents and
records pertinent to the transaction and for overseeing the surrogate
motherhood agreement.82 Court involvement may also be necessary
when the surrogate mother and her husband terminate parental rights, in
accordance with the promise in the contract, following the child's birth,
and the infertile wife adopts the child.83
77. This statement of the legality of the surrogate motherhood fee is necessary to rebut any
contention that payment of the fee is in violation of a baby-selling statute. See supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text and infra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text and infra note 83 and accompanying text.
79. The Hawaii bill, for example, provided that the courts should establish a maximum fee of
not less than $10,000 to be reviewed every two years.
80. See, e.g., Mich. H.B. 4555, § 9(5) (1985).
81. See Kan. S.B. 485, § 10(c) (1984); Mich. H.B. 4555, § 9(4) (1985). See also D.C. Council
Bill 6-152, § 7(d) (1985); but see S.C. H.B. 1098, § 20-7-3730(D) (1982) (permitting disclosure of
only nonidentifying information regarding family health and general background).
82. The type of information which may be filed with the court includes the following:
(1) the surrogate motherhood agreement; (2) the medical and psychological evaluations
of the infertile couple, the surrogate mother and her husband; (3) the name and address of
the surrogate mother; (4) any separate written consent by the surrogate and her husband
relinquishing parental rights; (5) petition for adoption filed by the infertile wife.
See, e.g., D.C. Council Bill 6-152, § 7 (1985); Kan. S.B. 485, § 10 (1984); Mich. H.B. 4555, § 9
(1985).
83. Some state bills require the infertile wife to petition the court for formal adoption of the
child. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly 1707, § 7510(a), 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985); Haw. H.B. 1009, § 2
(1983); S.C. H.B. 2098, § 20-7-3640 (1982). Other state bills provide that the child born pursuant to
a surrogate motherhood agreement is the legitimate child of the infertile couple if the legislative
requirements are met. See, e.g., D.C. Council Bill 6-152, § 3(b) (1985); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 126
(1987).
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D. Amendment of Existing Laws
Baby-selling statutes should be amended to explicitly exempt surrogate
motherhood arrangements from the prohibition. These statutes were en-
acted to deal with the special problem of black-market adoptions and to
prohibit the illegal purchase and sale of children. 84 Because the dangers
of black-market adoption are not present in a regulated surrogate moth-
erhood arrangement, the fee in the surrogate motherhood arrangement
may be properly viewed as compensation for the surrogate mother's serv-
ices. Without reasonable compensation, the surrogate mother probably
would not be willing to assume the risks and discomfort of pregnancy
and childbirth.85 Thus, in order for surrogate motherhood to remain a
viable option, reasonable compensation of the surrogate mother is
necessary.
Adoption statutes which provide for mandatory waiting periods be-
tween birth and adoption86 should also be amended to exempt surrogate
motherhood arrangements. Pre-adoption waiting periods are designed to
give the natural mother time to consider her decision to place her child
for traditional adoption and to ensure that consent to adoption is volun-
tary and not coerced. Under surrogate motherhood arrangements, how-
ever, the surrogate agrees to terminate her parental rights and to consent
to adoption prior to conception. A mandatory waiting period following
the child's birth is unnecessary in the surrogate motherhood context be-
cause surrogate motherhood legislation would provide for psychological
counseling of the surrogate prior to entering the surrogate motherhood
agreement to ensure that the surrogate understands the consequences of
the arrangement and has voluntarily consented to termination of paren-
tal rights.8 7
Imposition of the mandatory waiting period in the surrogate mother-
hood context would also interfere with the parties' intentions that the
infertile couple assume custody upon the birth of the child. 8 Moreover,
application of the mandatory waiting period to the surrogate mother-
hood arrangement may conflict with the best interests of the child. If the
surrogate mother is given an opportunity to withhold her consent to
adoption, a custody battle may ensue. The child's status will remain un-
84. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
85. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 9, at 66S.
86. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text.
88. Note, supra note 7, at 254.
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certain during the proceedings and the child may be placed with and
become attached to the couple that does not ultimately prevail in the
custody action.89
Finally, the artificial insemination statutes should declare the husband
of an artificially inseminated woman the legal father of the child only in
circumstances where the couple intends to conceive through artificial in-
semination because of the husband's infertility.9° Additionally, a provi-
sion should be added to artificial insemination statutes providing that a
child born as a result of a surrogate motherhood arrangement is the legit-
imate child of the sperm donor.91 This provision would also be helpful in
rebutting any common-law presumption that the surrogate's husband is
the legal father of the child.92
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the rise in the infertility rate, more couples are turning to
reproductive techniques to assist them in the conception process.93 The
surrogate motherhood arrangement is a reproductive option which raises
complex legal issues. The likelihood of litigation is much greater in the
context of surrogate motherhood arrangements than in other reproduc-
tive arrangements because of the surrogate mother's significant involve-
ment in the reproductive process.94 Leaving resolution of disputes to the
courts, without any legislative guidance, is likely to lead to piecemeal
solutions and inconsistent results. Existing legislation, which was en-
acted to deal with other concerns, cannot adequately address the issues
raised by surrogate motherhood arrangements.95
The surrogate motherhood arrangement is a complex legal arrange-
ment. Because it requires the cooperation of several individuals in the
reproductive process and involves relinquishment of parental rights and
the exchange of money, the potential for abuse exists. Infertile couples or
surrogate mothers, entering the arrangement without sufficient thought
or commitment, may attempt to back out when the baby is born. Fur-
thermore, unscrupulous intermediaries may bring infertile couples and
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Mich. H.B. 4556, § 111(7) (1985); N.Y. S.B. 1429, § 733 (1987).
92. See supra notes 28, 35, 74 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 16.
95. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
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surrogate mothers together solely to make a profit without concern for
the welfare of the parties. The evil, however, does not lie in surrogate
motherhood arrangements per se, but in the lack of regulation.9 6 Care-
fully drafted surrogate motherhood legislation would reduce the
probability of legal disputes and protect the interests of all parties to the
surrogate motherhood arrangement.
Laura A. Mellas
96. Several commentators agree that regulation of surrogate motherhood arrangements is nec-
essary. See, e.g., L. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 237; N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 13, at 264;
Note, supra note 16, at 41.
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